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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Justin Lee Pedersen appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Pedersen 
claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Several officers investigating a reported theft were at Pedersen's 
residence, which he shared with several others, when Pedersen arrived on his 
motorcycle. (Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.9, L.21, p.41, L.3 - p.42, L.10.) One of the 
detectives, Paul Jagosh, made contact with Pedersen after one of the individuals 
being interviewed identified Pedersen as the person who gave her the stolen 
property. (Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.16, L.12, p.42, Ls.6-20, p.44, Ls.7-17.) After 
obtaining information from Pedersen regarding his identity, Detective Jagosh told 
Pedersen "not to move" and went to contact dispatch to find out if Pedersen had 
any "wants [or] warrants." (Tr., p.44, L.7 - p.46, L.5.) While Detective Jagosh 
was running Pedersen's information through dispatch he saw Pedersen start to 
take his jacket off and again told him "not to move." (Tr., p.46, Ls.8-15.) 
Pedersen nevertheless proceeded to remove his jacket and handed it, along with 
his gloves, a buck knife, cell phone, an iPod, and his wallet to Colleen who was 
sitting nearby. (Tr., p.14, Ls.20-25, p.16, L.15 - p.17, L.23, p.44, Ls.18-21.) 
Pedersen then "proceeded to walk off with [a] cigarette" and sat next to another 
individual. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-9.) 
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After Pedersen sat down, Detective Jagosh returned and placed Pedersen 
under arrest on an outstanding warrant. (Tr., p.18, L.21 - p.19, L.13.) As 
Detective Jagosh was searching Pedersen and after he placed Pedersen in 
handcuffs, he directed another detective to retrieve Pedersen's jacket and other 
items that he gave to Colleen. (Tr., p.51, Ls.11-20.) A search of 
Pedersen's jacket revealed methamphetamine. Tr., p.30, L.2 - p.31, L.2, 
p.67, Ls.10-21.) 
The state charged Pedersen with felony possession of a controlled 
substance - methamphetamine. (R, pp.6-7, 33-34, 42-43.) Pedersen filed a 
motion to suppress, claiming the evidence was found during an illegal search. 
(R, pp.53-54.) The court conducted an evidentiary hearing after which it denied 
Pedersen's motion. (R., p.74.) Pedersen thereafter entered a conditional guilty 
plea, reserving his right to challenge the court's decision denying his request for 
suppression. (R, pp.86-89.) The court imposed a unified seven-year sentence 
with two years fixed and Pedersen filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of 
judgment. (R, pp.91-93, 96-98.) 
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ISSUE 
Pedersen states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.g.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
motion to 
Has Pedersen failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to a search incident to his 
arrest on a warrant? 
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ARGUMENT 
Pedersen Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence Found As A Result Of The Search Incident To His Arrest 
A. Introduction 
Pedersen contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress, arguing the search was an improper search incident to arrest. 
Specifically, Pedersen argues the search incident to arrest exception "is 
inapplicable based on the facts of this case" because his "jacket was not within 
the area of [his] 'immediate controL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Application of the 
correct legal standards to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and 
the district court's factual findings shows Pedersen has failed to meet his burden 
of showing error in the district court's decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Not Required 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
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New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a well-
established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. The scope of such a search includes 
"the arrestee's person and the area with his immediate control - construing that 
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. The justifications for 
a search incident to arrest include officer safety and prevention of the 
concealment or destruction of evidence. kL.; also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
338 (2009) (search incident to arrest exception "derives from interests in officer 
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest 
situations"). Only "[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the 
area that law enforcement officers seek to search" are the "justifications for the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception [ ] absent" such that the "rule does not apply." 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 339. 
The district court, relying on the foregoing principles and the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 997 P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 
2000), found the search of Pedersen's coat was a valid search incident to arrest. 
(See generally Tr., pp.75-82.) In Bowman, an officer stopped two men believing 
one of them had an outstanding arrest warrant. 134 Idaho at 177, 997 P.2d at 
638. The men agreed to talk to the officer and the individual whom the officer 
believed to be the subject of the outstanding arrest warrant identified himself as 
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Bowman. !sL. at 177-178, 997 P.2d at 638-639. While the officer was running a 
warrants check, a woman came out of an adjacent mobile home and approached 
Bowman. !sL. at 178, 997 P.2d at 639. After the officer learned that Bowman had 
a warrant for his arrest, "but prior to informing Bowman that he was under arrest," 
the officer "observed Bowman take of his leather jacket and give it to the 
woman." !sL. The officer exited his vehicle, told Bowman he was under arrest 
and advised the woman she was not allowed to take Bowman's jacket. !sL. The 
woman handed the jacket to the officer who subsequently searched it and found 
a pipe, marijuana and methamphetamine. kL. 
On appeal, the Court considered whether Bowman was entitled to 
suppression of the evidence found in his coat. In deciding there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation, the Court of Appeals discussed the justifications 
underlying the search incident to arrest exception and held: 
To allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before 
his arrest and thereby avoid the search of said item would seriously 
undercut the purposes and policy behind the search incident to that 
arrest - ensuring the safety of officers and bystanders through the 
recovery of weapons within the defendant's area of immediate 
control and preventing the loss or destruction of evidence of 
criminal activity. Faced with the possibility that the jacket might 
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime which could be lost or 
destroyed, we conclude that [the officer] acted reasonably in 
requesting the jacket in order to search it incident to Bowman's 
arrest. We hold that such search did not violate Bowman's 
constitutional rights. 
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 180, 997 P.2d at 641 (footnote omitted). 
The district court reached the same conclusion in this case. Relevant to 
the court's determination were the following factual findings: 
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While Detective Jagosh was running the defendant for 
warrants, the defendant handed his gloves, his iPod, his knife, his 
wallet, and his cellphone to Colleen. Colleen was located on the 
steps -- well, steps similarly next to the front of the house. 
The defendant knew that he had an outstanding warrant. 
Of some significance is the fact that, prior to the defendant 
handing these items over to Colleen, Detective Jagosh had 
instructed the defendant to remain seated where he was, and the 
defendant specifically disregarded or disobeyed that instruction in 
getting up and moving over to where Colleen was to hand off those 
items. 
And I'll also note, because it does go directly to [defense 
counsel's] argument distinguishing Bowman, that the defendant 
himself testified that it was chilly that evening in March. Colleen 
was located ten to 15 feet away from the defendant. And, again, 
Colleen is the individual to whom the defendant gave his property. 
There was no one in between Colleen and the defendant. The 
defendant was arrested for [an] outstanding warrant and placed in 
handcuffs. 
I'll also note, as a finding of fact, I certainly believe the 
defendant when he testified that the male he referred to as Junior 
was, quote, "bigger and kind of intimating [sic]," end quote. 
I also want to note, because I think it's important, the factual 
finding that the information that Detective Jagosh had was not 
simply that there was a female in the house, but that there was a 
female in the house who's not coming out. In other words, efforts 
had been made to retrieve that female from the house, and she 
was unresponsive to those efforts. 
(Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.78, L.19.) 
Addressing whether Pedersen's coat was within the scope of his 
immediate control, the district court specifically noted the factors the Court of 
Appeals in Bowman directed trial courts to consider on this issue. (Tr., p.79, l.23 
- p.80, L.11.) Those factors are: 
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(1) the distance between the arrestee and the place searched; (2) 
whether the arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained; (3) 
whether police were positioned so as to block the arrestee from the 
area searched; (4) the ease of access to the area itself; and (5) the 
number of officers present as compared to the number of 
companions of the arrestee. 
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 179-180,997 P.2d at 640-641. 
Applying the foregoing factors, the district court found: 
The distance between the arrestee and the place searched. That 
distance, as I said, was ten to 15 feet; second, whether the arrestee 
is handcuffed and otherwise detained. He was handcuffed at the 
time that the search took place; third, whether police were 
positioned so as to block the arrestee from the area search. The 
police were not positioned so as to stop or block the arrestee from 
the area search; fourth, ease of access to the area itself. 
I've looked at State's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4. And it's clear 
from looking at the photographs that the distance between where 
Colleen was seated and the defendant was seated on those 
railroad ties was quite short. It could have been covered in a 
matter of steps. So on that fourth factor there was great ease of 
access to the area itself. 
And, finally, the number of officers versus the number of 
companions of the arrestee. I think this is the factor that the parties 
have argued the most. And I don't know that this -- on the facts of 
this case, that there's a magic number that controls the outcome. 
And, I think, frankly, I can go through the officers that were 
there, versus the -- we have called them civilians that were there: 
One, two, three, four, five, six, seven civilians; one, two, three, four, 
five, six officers. So we are at about a one-to-one ratio. 
But that's not really controlling in this case, from my 
perspective, because this is not a controlled situation. This is a 
moving parts situation. It's not a situation where everybody is in 
one place. You have people that are in the backyard. You have a 
person that is in the house, refusing to come out. 
There was also testimony that a Garden City officer -- and I'll 
make this as a factual finding -- pulled one of the civilians to the left 
side of the home. So we have a number of locations that are 
uncontrolled by these officers. 
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And, frankly, even if there were eight officers to five civilians, 
even if they had outnumbered them, I can't say, given [t]he moving 
parts and, frankly, the volatility of the situation, that the officers 
could be safe. 
(Tr., p.80, L.2 - p.81, L.23.) 
Based on the court's factual findings and the applicable legal standards, 
the district court correctly concluded "there was a risk to the officers" and a 
potential for the "concealment or destruction of the evidence" justifying a search 
incident to arrest. (Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.3.) This conclusion is supported by 
Bowman, supra, and Supreme Court precedent. Chimel, supra; Gant, 556 U.S. 
at 343, 347 (recognizing the twin rationales of Chimel and noting "there may be 
still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a 
search" beyond those specifically articulated in prior cases). 
On appeal, Pedersen disagrees with the district court's conclusion 
regarding the risk presented. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-17.) Pedersen 
emphasizes that he was handcuffed and had given his jacket to someone else; 
however, these factors were properly evaluated by the district court in reaching 
its conclusion, which conclusion is consistent with Bowman. Pedersen's 
unsurprising disagreement with the district court's assessment does not establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
Regarding Bowman, Pedersen claims it is "distinguishable." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.17.) By "distinguishable," Pedersen appears to mean the case is no 
longer good law or has been narrowed as he later asserts "the Bowman Court 
used five factors identified by an outdated legal treatise" and claims "Bowman 
offers little guidance on the issue in the case at hand" because it was "decided 
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prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in [State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 
103 P.3d 448 (2004)]" and, according to Pedersen, "this case is strikingly similar 
to the facts of LaMay." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) In reality, this case is "strikingly 
similar" to the facts of Bowman; nevertheless, Pedersen's claim that LaMay 
compels a conclusion that the court erred in denying Pedersen's suppression 
motion fails. 
In LaMay, officers made contact with several individuals in a hotel room 
after determining that one of the room's occupants had outstanding arrest 
warrants. 140 Idaho at 837, 103 P.3d at 450. "There were seven people in the 
room," including LaMay, who "was laying on the bed with a woman watching 
television." kL The officers "took everybody except for Joseph LaMay into the 
hallway, a distance of approximately fifteen feet from where LaMay had been at 
the initial encounter"; LaMay was "taken into the bathroom for questioning." kL 
During a protective sweep of the room, an officer "saw a backpack on the floor 
about ten inches from where LaMay's hand had been hanging off the bed when 
the officers entered the room." kL After LaMay was arrested, handcuffed, and 
"seated in the hallway with the rest of the persons from the room," an officer 
searched his backpack, "finding currency, cocaine, and LaMay's driver's license." 
kL The district court suppressed and the state appealed. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 
837,103 P.3d at 450. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court cited the Bowman factors as 
relevant to the determination of "what is reasonably within an arrestee's area of 
immediate controL" LaMay, 140 Idaho at 838, 103 P.3d at 451. Thus, 
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Pedersen's complaint about the Court of Appeals' "outdated" reliance on those 
same factors is disingenuous at best. Applying the Bowman factors, the 
Supreme Court in LaMay concluded: 
The backpack was nearly fifteen feet away from LaMay and located 
in a different room. It presented no immediate danger to the 
officers or others surrounding the arrest. ... The backpack and its 
contents were not in danger of being destroyed. LaMay was 
restrained in handcuffs and guarded by an officer in the hallway. 
There were no exigent circumstances in this case justifying the 
search of the backpack without a warrant. 
LaMay, 140 Idaho at 839, 103 P.3d at 452. 
Once the Court examines the respective facts of Bowman and LaMay, it is 
readily apparent why Pedersen is incorrect in his assertion that LaMay is the 
more relevant of the two. Unlike LaMay, and like Bowman, Pedersen gave his 
property to another, undoubtedly knowing he was about to be arrested, and that 
person, who was not restrained, had the ability to facilitate Pedersen's access to 
the coat to obtain a weapon (such as his knife) or destroy any evidence 
contained therein. Viewed this way, there is no reasoned basis for distinguishing 
between the officer's ability to search Pedersen's pockets had he been wearing 
it, even if handcuffed, and the ability to search the coat under the circumstances 
present here. 
Just as the Court concluded in Bowman, this Court should conclude that 
officers acted reasonably in this case by searching Pedersen's jacket. Pedersen 
has failed to meet his burden of showing otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district 
court entered upon Pedersen's conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2014. 
JEssrdA M. LORELLO 
Depui1 Attorney General 
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Dr~ty Attorney General 
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